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Executive Summary 
Development banks operating in  Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are falling far short of 
playing the key role they need to in spurring economic recovery and sustainable development. Given 
the significant market failures involved in shifting investment into sustainable infrastructure, and the 
fact that the region is in the midst of an economic downturn, development banks are essential to 
filling a $260 billion dollar annual infrastructure gap and a $110 billion dollar annual gap in financing 
for climate change. According to our estimates however, development banks provide just $8.7 billion 
per year in terms of green finance in general, and climate finance in particular is just $5.9 billion 
per year. Green financial flows from development banks need to be scaled up significantly, and 
alongside proper governance structures to ensure that green financial flows translate into sustainable 
development outcomes.
Development banks will be essential in achieving two of the most important Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs).  Development banks can help smooth the burden of risk with long run investments, 
and can help correct for market failures.  Development banks can also help mainstream sustainable 
practices, climate change considerations (i.e. low carbon development and climate resilience) as 
well as play a catalytic and convening role in fostering dialogue and exchange of experiences on 
these topics.  Development banks also can help ‘crowd-in’ the private sector and other sources of 
international finance.  
Two of the SDGs are important to emphasize.  Goal seven is to “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all,” while goal nine is to “develop quality, reliable, sustainable 
and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-border infrastructure, to support economic 
development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all (United 
Nations, 2015).  Bhattarcharya, Oppenheim, and Stern (2015) argue that development banks have 
an essential role to play to help move nations and regions from ‘business as usual outcomes’, to 
‘sustainable infrastructure outcomes’ as depicted in Table E.S. 1.
Table E.S. 1 Development Banks and Sustainable Development
Source: Bhattacharya, Oppenheim, and Stern (2015)
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From “business as usual” outcomes…  … to sustainable and inclusive infrastructure outcomes 
Inadequate investments in sustainable 
infrastructure in most countries, constraining 
growth and development 
Scaled investment in sustainable infrastructure globally, 
leading to improved development and growth 
Inadequate provision of affordable infrastructure for 
the poor, creating risk of serious reversals in the 
fight for development and poverty reduction 
Increased infrastructure access and affordability for the 
poor, leading to improved development outcomes 
High proportion of high-carbon infrastructure 
investments and inefficient use of infrastructure, 
creating danger of lock-in and irreversible climate 
change 
Increased preference for investments in low-carbon 
infrastructure, mitigating climate change risks and 
increasing probability of a 2-degree scenario.  
Low resilience infrastructure, creating vulnerability 
to risks of climate change (especially among the 
poor) 
More resilient infrastructure that accounts for climate risks 
and protects populations most vulnerable to climate 
change 
 
To this end a number of development banks have pledged to increase finance for sustainable 
development in general, and low carbon development in particular.  In 2015, after China pledged to 
infuse $3.2 billion into a developing country fund for climate change, the Asian Development Bank, 
the World Bank and others began pledging major increases as well.  The World Bank pledged to 
increase climate finance to $29 billion (an increase by one third) by 2025 and the Inter-American 
Development Bank pledged to make climate finance 25-30 percent of total lending by that time. 
This study provides an initial assessment of the extent to which the existing development banking 
regime in LAC is poised to achieve these goals.  More specifically, we ask two research questions. 
First, to what extent do IDBs operating in LAC support green finance in the region?  Second, to what 
extent do IDBs deploy environmental and social safeguard systems in LAC? LAC has made strides 
in green financing and in safeguarding large projects in a manner that is environmentally sustainable 
and socially inclusive.  However, development banks will need to rapidly increase their engagement 
in both of these areas in order help turn the region’s economies toward sustainable development.
We create a database of development lending across the Americas and estimate the extent to which 
such finance is ‘green’ based on a new tracking methodology agreed upon by major multilateral, sub-
regional, and national development banks.  These banks define green finance as financing for climate 
change mitigation or adaptation, as well as environmental protection and remediation at the project 
level.  According to our estimates we find that:
• Total development bank finance in Latin America and the Caribbean has stood at 
approximately 1.2 percent of GDP per annum since 2003. The emergence of Chinese and 
Brazilian development banks as lenders to LAC governments has helped fill a gap left by the 
World Bank in development bank finance in the region.
• Thirty-three percent of all development bank finance in LAC is not green.  This significant 
amount of development bank finance flows into extractive industries, the generation of fossil 
fuels, and conventional infrastructure projects that can accentuate global climate change, 
trigger local environmental problems, and adversely impact local communities.  
• Green finance is 20 percent of total development bank financing in LAC.  Since 2007, green 
finance has been $61 billion equal to $8.7 billion per year.  $5.9 billion of the green finance is for 
climate mitigation and adaptation.
 ° Three leaders in green financial flows are the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
World Bank, and CAF-Development Bank of Latin America when measured by total 
volume of green financing 
 ° Two laggards are banks from the United States and China.  The United States 
Export-Import bank is the most lacking in providing green finance to Latin America 
in terms of total volume and green finance as a percent of total finance. The China 
Development Bank provides the largest amount of finance for fossil fuel energy and 
conventional infrastructure.
• There is a lack of coherence in the monitoring and governance of development bank finance 
from a social and environmental perspective. 
 ° Whereas there is a uniform set of common principles and tracking methodologies 
among development banks for defining green financial flows, there is a lack of a 
unified understanding and principles with respect to monitoring the environmental 
impacts of green financial flows and setting environmental and social safeguards.
 ° Many large projects, whether classified as green or not, may not be well 
safeguarded and could bring significant risks to local communities, the local and 
global environment, and the balance sheets of development banks and private firms 
engaged in those projects.
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Drawing from these findings we recommend that development banks:
• Strengthen the capacity of development banks to invest in green finance-- through increasing 
the capital base of existing banks, creating new ‘green’ banks, scaling up “green bond” programs, 
expanding sustainable co-financing programs, and creating a better awareness in the financial 
sector about the unique characteristics of green finance;
• Strengthen the governance of development finance in LAC. International development 
banks in LAC need to put in place the proper monitoring systems to evaluate the social and 
environmental impacts of both green and non-green financial flows, and to safeguard such 
finance so as to prevent and mitigate significant social and environmental risk. 
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1. Introduction
Development banks have a unique role to play in LAC and in emerging market and development 
countries across the globe.  Development banks seek to correct key market and government failures 
and crowd in private sector economic activity into areas such as infrastructure and cleaner energy 
technologies, as well as into policy formation and anti-poverty programs.  What is more, as LAC seeks 
to move past this latest economic downturn, development banks can act in a counter-cyclical manner 
in order to spark economic recovery and trigger structural transformation throughout the region’s 
economies. 
LAC faces a significant infrastructure gap, with more than US $170 to $260 billion needed in 
infrastructure investments annually over the next decade (ECLAC, 2011).  Moreover, the region 
faces a $100 billion annual gap in finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation (IADB, 2012). 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) infrastructure spending has the highest multiplier 
impact during a downturn (IMF, 2014).  In an examination of LAC, World Bank researchers found that 
every one percent increase in spending and upgrading of infrastructure in the region could add as much 
as 2 percentage points of annual economic growth in growth over the long run (Calderon, 2010).  An 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) study shows that a 1 percent reduction in transport costs 
would increase exports by as much as 4 percent in Mexico and 7.9 percent in Colombia (Mesquita 
Moreira et al, 2013). 
Development banks have also been asked to play an enhanced role in meeting the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) that pledge to both “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable 
and modern energy for all,” and to “develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, 
including regional and trans-border infrastructure, to support economic development and human 
well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all (United Nations, 2015).”  The 
geographical location of LAC endows the region with abundant wealth in natural resources, but 
also a particular vulnerability to climate change.  The extraction of such resources can also often 
strain sources of livelihoods and threaten biodiversity as well as sources of water and sustenance for 
people and economies over the long run. Moreover, the over-reliance of economic activity in natural 
resources has also been characterized with dramatic boom and bust cycles that have hindered the 
development process in the Americas for over a century (Bertola and Ocampo, 2012).
In terms of climate change, LAC is only responsible for approximately 12.5 percent of global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but is disproportionately impacted by climate change as many 
areas in the region are seriously affected by droughts, flooding, cyclones and the El Nino-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon (Maplecroft, 2014). Damages resulting from extreme weather 
related to climate change have not only jeopardized socioeconomic activities but also eroded wealth 
accumulated from previous episodes of economic growth.  According to a joint study by the IADB 
with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the annual economic costs of climate change in LAC are $100 
billion per year (IADB, 2012). 
In this study, we examine the extent to which development banks are providing international 
financing to Latin American governments for environmentally sustainable development projects, and 
the extent to which environmental safeguards are incorporated into the project operations of these 
development banks.  To answer this question, we create a database of development bank finance in 
LAC from 2003 to 2014 and code that data to examine the environmental profile of such lending. 
Second, we conduct a comparative analysis of the environmental safeguards provisions of these 
banks operating in LAC.  After sharing the results of these exercises we provide recommendations for 
policy and future research.
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This study comprises of five additional parts following this introduction.  Part two is a discussion 
of the methodology deployed to generate our findings.  Part three is a presentation of the dataset 
and general levels of green finance in LAC.  Part four is a detailed analysis of green finance in LAC 
between 2007 and 2014.  Part five is a comparative analysis of environmental and social safeguards 
in LAC.  The final part summarizes our findings, offers policy recommendations, and directions for 
future research.
2. Methodology
We create a database of development bank finance to sovereign governments in LAC and estimate 
the extent to which such financial flows can be designated as green finance according to a new 
definition of green finance.  Moreover, we conduct a comparative analysis of policies to safeguard 
the social and environmental risks of large projects and programs finance by development banks 
operating in the region.
Eleven development banks provide the majority of international development bank finance to Latin 
American and Caribbean governments. We define an international development bank (IDB) as a 
development bank that provides finance to sovereign governments outside the country of the bank’s 
origin. Our sample thus includes traditional multilateral development banks (MDBs) operating 
in the region such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), sub-
regional development banks like the CAF - Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean 
Development Bank (CaDB), as well as a number of national development banks that have been 
making loans to other LACn governments, such as Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES), the 
China Development Bank (CDB) and Germany’s KfW. 
We create a database of international lending to LACn governments and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) for each of these banks for the period 2003-2014.  For national development banks operating 
in the region, we only track and analyze their activities outside of their country of origin.  The full list 
of banks examined for this study are:
• The World Bank Group (WB)
• Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
• CAF-Development Bank of Latin America 
• The Caribbean Development Bank (CaDB)
• European Investment Bank (EIB)
• Agence Française de Développement (AFD)
• The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)
• KfW Development Bank (KfW)
• China Development Bank (CDB)
• China Export Import Bank (CHEXIM)
• Export-Import Bank of the United States (US EXIM)
We examine the extent to which international development banks operating in LAC support green 
finance and safeguard their portfolio of environmentally sensitive projects.  For the 12-year period 
under examination we track the annual flows of each bank to LAC to demonstrate the evolution of 
development finance in the region in terms of the total volume and composition as well as each bank’s 
contribution. Furthermore, we create a more detailed project-level database for the period of 2007-
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2014 in order to pinpoint the composition of development bank lending for this latter period (project-
level data is not widely available for all the banks previous to 2007).
We compile official data from banks’ project databases and annual reports. The project information 
of the IADB and the IBRD of the World Bank group is downloaded directly from respective project 
datasets, and the data of CAF, CaDB, EIB, AFD and US EXIM Bank was extracted from their annual 
reports. We refer to the newly launched transparent portals of KfW and BNDES for their project info 
and the China-Latin America Finance database at the Inter-American Dialogue for data from China’s 
policy banks in LAC (see Gallagher and Meyers, 2014). 
Our research is limite to IDB finance to sovereign governments rather than to both sovereign 
governments and the private sector.  Indeed, many of the banks in our study provide lending to 
both public and private sectors, and many of them even have a private sector financing arm, such 
as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, the Proparco of the French 
Development Agency (AFD) and the German Investment and Development Corporation (DEG) of 
the KfW group. Taking the year of 2014 as an example, the non-sovereign guaranteed operations of 
IADB were only $2.8 billion compared to the total commitments of $13.8 billion, which accounted for 
20 percent. A similar percentage was seen in the lending of KfW and AFD. The private sector share 
of World Bank and EIB’s financing was higher, at 30-40 percent. CAF was an exception, whose non-
sovereign guaranteed operations were larger than sovereign operations, reaching 60 percent of total 
commitments.
We limited the scope of study to public lending, which is lending to governments or national 
companies, based on two considerations. First, the majority of loans provided by IDBs are still 
sovereign guaranteed loans and for some banks in our sample there is either no private sector lending 
or the data for such lending is difficult to obtain. Second, since our study focuses on green finance, 
an area that is less attractive to private investors because the returns of many green projects are less 
likely to be commensurate with risks in the short term, we restrict this analysis to public lending in 
order to illuminate this process and examine the possibility of leveraging more private investment to 
support green and sustainable development throughout the operations of IDBs. 
There are a variety of definitions and approaches to measuring ‘green finance,’ even among 
development banks. We deploy the definition of green finance and methodology of green mapping 
of the International Development Finance Club (IDFC)—an association of national and sub-regional 
development banks across the world— as our benchmark.  In our sample, CAF, BNDES, CDB, AFD, 
and KfW are all members of the IDFC.  The IDFC compared its methodology for tracking climate 
finance with that of the MDBs and found them ‘largely consistent’ for climate change mitigation but 
less so for climate adaptation (IDFC, 2015a).  To close the gap, IDFC collaborated with the major 
MDBs in 2014 to create a common set of principles for tracking development bank finance for climate 
mitigation and adaptation (IDFC, 2015b).  We deploy the newly agreed-upon methodology to track 
green development finance across this sample of development banks operating in LAC.  The IDFC 
defines ‘green finance’ as financing for climate change mitigation or adaptation, as well environmental 
protection and remediation at the project level. Table 1 shows how we deploy the IDFC mapping 
method to our study.
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Table 1: Summary of IDFC green finance tracking methodology
Source: IDFC green finance tracking methodology (2014a)
Building a project-level database from 2007 to 2014, we code projects as being ‘green finance’ or 
not.  Then, for green projects we divide them into the subcategories listed here in Table 1.  There 
are significant limitations to the IDFC approach, as it is not clear whether these ‘categories’ of green 
financial flows are significantly correlated with actual reductions in emissions and other social and 
environmental impacts.  
To answer our research question regarding environment and social safeguards, we conduct a 
comparative ‘desk’ analysis of development bank safeguard policies as published on bank web pages. 
In addition, we conducted telephone and email interviews with some of the banks in our sample, 
and surveyed the secondary literature on the subject.  We acknowledge that such an analysis is also 
limited, and would ideally be coupled with on-the-ground case studies because what is on paper 
at development banks might diverge from what happens in terms of actual performance.  We plan 
to do such fieldwork as a follow up to this study.  Nevertheless, these two exercises allow us to 
perform an initial survey of the state of green finance and social and environmental safeguards among 
development banks operating in the Americas.
3. Development Banks in LAC 2003-2014
We estimate that IDBs provided approximately $500 billion to the LAC region between 2003-2014. 
The yearly average was $41.3 billion, representing upwards of 1.2 percent of annual GDP in LAC with a 
peak of 2 percent of GDP in 2010. As shown in Figure 1, finance to sovereign governments is the lion’s 
share of IDB finance in LAC, at $380 billion during the same period or 1 percent of GDP.
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Category Definition Representative Eligible Project Categories 
Clean energy and 
mitigation of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions 
Activity that contributes to 
reducing or avoiding GHG 
emissions or to enhance GHG 
sequestration 
Renewable energy supply 
Energy efficiency in industry and buildings 
Process emissions in industry and fugitive emissions 
Sustainable transport 
Agriculture, forestry and land-use  
Carbon capture and storage 
Budget support to a climate change mitigation policy 
Adaptation to climate 
change impacts 
Activity that intends to reduce 
the vulnerability of human or 
natural systems to the 
impacts of climate change 
and climate-related risks, by 
maintaining or increasing 
adaptive capacity and 
resilience 
Water preservation 
Agriculture, natural resources, ecosystem adaptation 
Coastal protection 
Other disaster risk reduction 
Budget support to a climate change adaptation policy 
Water, sanitation, and 
other environmental 
objectives 
Activity that does not directly 
target climate change 
mitigation or adaptation but is 
related to sustainable 
development with a positive 
impact on the environment 
Water supply 
Wastewater treatment 
Waste management 
Industrial pollution control 
Soil remediation and mine rehabilitation 
Sustainable infrastructure 
Biodiversity 
Figure 1: Development Finance in LAC 2003-2014
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database; GDP 
source: World Development Indicator Database, Latin America and the Caribbean (developing only).
Four development banks provided the lion’s share of sovereign development finance in LAC: the 
IADB, World Bank, CDB and CAF contributed roughly 85 percent of the total loans during the period 
examined. The most significant newcomers to the LAC development finance landscape are China’s 
policy banks, the CDB and CHEXIM, which combined have become the largest annual lenders in LAC 
since 2007.  Without development finance from China development bank finance in LAC would have 
been 25 percent less due to the cutting back of commitments from the World Bank and other sources.
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Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
Despite the upward trend of development bank finance in LAC, since 2011 the World Bank has 
tightened its lending to the region to pre-crisis levels. The US EXIM bank and three European financial 
institutions maintained their shares and accounted for 9 percent of the total, though the US EXIM 
bank has halted new lending in 2015. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that BNDES, the development 
bank of Brazil, began to increase its overseas investments in 2007 and has financed projects in 
several countries in Latin America including Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Argentina, and 
Ecuador. Although the total amount of commitments is still small compared to other banks, BNDES is 
a new development finance player in Latin America that is gathering momentum. In three consecutive 
years from 2009 to 2011, BNDES annually average overseas commitments surpassed $1 billion. 
GREENING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN THE AMERICAS         |         bu.edu/gegi         |         12/2015 11
Figure 2: IDB Commitments in LAC 2003-2014
Table 2: IDB Commitments to Governments in LAC 2003-2014 (USD Millions)
                        
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database 
Different development banks appear to serve different clients in the Americas. Brazil is the most 
popular debtor, receiving loans from all the banks in our sample except the Caribbean development 
bank. US EXIM Bank devotes most of its resources to Mexico and Colombia while China’s banks 
prefer Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina (Gallagher and Irwin, 2015). 
Finally, the development banks operating in the region are in part addressing the infrastructure gap. 
Since 2002 there has only been an annual investment of approximately 2 percent of GDP in LAC, with 
the private sector providing 1.3 percent of GDP and the public sector providing 0.7 percent (ECLAC, 
2011).  According to our estimates, development banks provided 29 percent of that annual public 
finance for infrastructure in the region since 2007.
4. Green Finance in LAC:  2007-2014
To what extent has the annual 1 percent of GDP in annual development bank finance to sovereign 
governments in the region contributed to sustainable development? In an attempt to answer this 
question we created a project-level database of the banks in our sample from 2007-2014 and 
examined the extent to which different banks supported green finance (as defined by the IDFC). 
Between 2007 and 2014, LAC governments received more than $314 billion from these eleven IDBs 
in the following six sectors exhibited in Figure 3: governance and social development, green finance, 
conventional infrastructure, conventional energy, finance, education and health. According to our 
estimates, one-third of development bank commitments were focused in the first category: efforts to 
improve the public administration and social development of the region. 
The second largest proportion of the development bank finance portfolio in the region is green finance, 
at 20 percent.  Infrastructure projects comprise 18 percent of the development bank finance in the 
region, while conventional energy stood at 14 percent.  Loans and credit lines to support financial 
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  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
IADB  6,476   5,564   6,465   5,461   6,870   9,126   14,588   11,370   9,411   9,924   11,799   10,743  
CDB  -     -     -     -     4,930   4,000   12,050   33,054   7,800   2,700   15,277   2,499  
WB   5,675   5,003   4,921   5,654   4,331   4,354   13,829   13,679   9,169   6,181   4,769   4,609  
CAF  2,166   2,330   2,473   3,791   2,984   3,343   5,590   5,796   4,528   4,586   5,523   5,052  
US EXIM  972   1,258   1,048   1,247   327   855   1,450   1,016   4,407   2,668   1,589   1,000  
CHEXIM  -     -     30   -     45   -     178   2,652   2,579   250   2,494   6,094  
BNDES  113   78   239   81   1,165   139   940   1,336   1,480   308   1,172   550  
KfW  268   270   216   332   370   649   530   560   745   509   880   1,989  
AFD  -     20   -     12   54   337   398   1,477   1,262   1,289   1,192   1,097  
EIB  41   61   106   50   37   138   575   54   980   257   479   573  
CaDB   192   113   138   121   179   298   152   270   145   104   139   244  
 
services amounted for 10 percent while another 5 percent of the total loans went into education and 
health.
Figure 3: Development Finance Sector Distribution 2007-14
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
We estimate that development banks provided approximately $61 billion, or $8.7 billion per year in 
green finance between 2007 and 2014—amounting to 20 percent of all development bank finance 
in LAC. 
Until recently, there had not been an internationally agreed upon definition for green and climate 
finance. It is a broad term that refers to investments that contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions 
and encourage sustainable development. However, over the past half decade the IDFC has been 
seeking to create a unified definition of such finance.  In addition to helping to sharpen the concept of 
green finance, the IDFC has also recently published a ‘tracking methodology.’  While some analysts 
may take issue with specifics from the tracking methodology, for the purposes of this study we deploy 
the IDFC methodology given that it has been accepted by the IDFC membership and the MDBs as 
well.  Drawing from the IDFC approach, we first group green finance into three categories: 1) Clean 
energy and mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 2) Adaptation to climate change impacts and 3) 
Water, sanitation, and other environmental objectives. To provide more accurate and precise tracking 
data, a list of subcategories was created under each theme (IDFC, 2014a).
Using this methodology, we coded all the projects from 11 banks during 2007-14 as “green” or 
“conventional”. Also in accordance with the IDFC guidelines, we divided all the green projects into 
three categories 1) clean energy and climate change mitigation 2) climate change adaptation and 3) 
water, sanitation and other environment. We estimate that the annual amount of green finance was 
about $61 billion and accounted for 20 percent of total commitments provided by IDBs in LAC during 
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the same period. The majority of green financial flows in LAC are in climate mitigation representing 56 
percent of all green finance, climate adaptation (11 percent), and water and sanitation (33 percent). 
In all then, climate finance amounts to just over $40 billion or $5.9 billion per year.
Figure 4: Composition of IDB Green Finance in LAC, 2007-14
 
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
Figure 5 ranks IDBs in LAC by the total volume of green financing during the period.  By volume, the 
IADB, the WORLD BANK, and the CAF stand out as the three largest financiers of green finance in the 
region.  The two Chinese development banks, the two European national development banks form the 
middle group all at approximately $3 billion during the period.  The USEXIM bank provides the least 
amount of green finance to LAC, along with the EIB, BNDES and CaDB.  
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Figure 5: Ranking IDBs for Green Finance
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
The USEXIM Bank also ranks the lowest in terms of green finance as a percent of total finance, with 
the EIB and KfW ranking the highest. Although the amount of loans provided by three European 
development banks (EIB, AFD and KfW) was only 4 percent of the total, as a percentage of their own 
total lending they lead the pack in green finance as a percent of total finance. 
Table 3: Green Finance within Banks 2007-14
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database.
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Bank Green Finance Amount (USD Millions) Percentage of Total Commitments 
KfW 3,592 71% 
EIB 3,094 58% 
AFD 6,943 45% 
CAF 10,861 29% 
BNDES 1,976 28% 
World Bank 17,142 28% 
CHEXIM 3,339 23% 
IADB 18,176 22% 
Caribbean DB 333 22% 
CDB 4,699 6% 
US EXIM 65 1% 
 
EIB and KfW devoted more than half of their financing to support sustainable development, and AFD 
contributed 49 percent of its commitments to green projects as well. The two banks with the least 
amount of green finance are the Caribbean Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States.  
We discuss potential shortcomings of counting hydropower projects as ‘green’ in section 4.2 on 
‘clean energy.’  We thus also calculated green financial flows to LAC without hydropower.  Such 
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BOX 1: The Western Hemisphere’s Green Bank: North American Development Bank (NADB)  
 
While conventional development banks are being encouraged to increase their level and proportion 
of green finance, a number of countries including the UK, Australia and Japan have established full 
green banks where the entire portfolio is centered on green finance (Zhu, Leung and Horn-
Phathanothai 2015). Unbeknownst to many, the Western Hemisphere has had a green bank since 
long before the term had arisen: the North American Development Bank (NADB) is more than 20 
years old and engages exclusively in green projects. 
 
NADB was created along with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to mitigate 
environmental concerns stemmed from increased US-Mexico trade in the border region between 
those two countries. It started operations in 1994, with initial capitalization subscription from the 
US and Mexican Governments. NADB offers direct financing to private and public entities for 
projects implemented in 10 states on the US-Mexico border.1  
 
One of the three basic eligibility criteria of NADB is the project “must remedy an environmental 
and/or human health problem.” As of June 2015, NADB has approved loans and grants of $2.7 
billion for projects implemented both in the US and Mexico. The portfolio in Mexico is about $1.5 
billion, including projects that aim to improve air quality, water supply, wastewater management, 
basic infrastructure and public transportation. Those projects have benefited more than 15 million 
people living in the border area. NADB has increased its lending for renewable energy projects since 
2014. For example, the bank approved loans of $140 million to support a wind project in Nuevo 
León, Mexico in 2014, which has also been the largest loan since the bank’s establishment.  
 
Representative projects of NADB  
Country State Year Amount  
(USD Million) 
Project 
Mexico Nuevo León 2014 70 Ventika Wind Energy Project  
Mexico Nuevo León 2014 70 Ventika Wind Energy Project II 
Mexico Baja California 2009 57 
Comprehensive road rehabilitation 
project 
Mexico Tamaulipas 2014 55 Tres Mesas Wind Energy Project 
Mexico Sonora 2011 48 Wastewater treatment plant project 
Mexico Nuevo León 2014 46 Air Quality improvement project 
Mexico Baja California 2009 45 
Comprehensive road rehabilitation 
project to improve air quality  
Mexico Tamaulipas  2008 36 Air quality and paving project 
Mexico  Nuevo León 2010 32 
Basic environmental infrastructure 
program for substandard urban 
developments in Nuevo León 
Mexico Chihuahua 2014 31 
Comprehensive paving project to 
improve urban mobility  
Source: North American Development Bank, Summary of completed project & Summary of project implementation 
activities: Active Projects 
 
1 The 10 states include Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas of Mexico and California, 
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas of the US. 
calculations do not significantly impact the order of green finance performance among development 
banks in LAC, but reduces total green finance during the period to just over $50 billion.  Moreover, in 
the case of China’s two development banks 94 percent of green finance is in hydropower.  Without 
hydropower these banks would be among considered as significantly lagging in green finance for LAC. 
4.1 Climate Mitigation
Fifty-six percent—or $33.8 billion—of all IDB green finance in LAC falls into the category of climate 
mitigation as defined by IDFC.  The largest class of mitigation projects by IDBs in LAC are cleaner 
energy projects, which amounted to $14.6 billion during the period under examination.  It should be 
noted that green energy projects are outweighed by conventional energy (fossil fuels) projects by 
160 Percent.  That may seem high, but there is some evidence that green finance in LAC may be an 
improvement by global historical standards.  While no LAC-wide study has been conducted, a 2008 
study of green finance by the MDBs from 1980 to 1999 put global conventional energy finance at 
three times green finance, down from fourteen times in the early 1980s (Hicks et al, 2008). 
4.1.1 Clean Energy
Cleaner energy finance is significant in the region, and is also one of the areas where innovative co-
financing and ‘green bond’ programs are taking place. Table 4 provides some illustrative examples of 
major cleaner energy projects financed by IDBs in LAC. Hydropower projects are the largest category 
of cleaner energy investment in our sample, which represent 70 percent of the total cleaner energy 
finance during the period under examination.  There are also significant projects in solar, wind, and 
access to renewable energy to the poor.
In terms of hydropower, it is important to highlight that, according to the IDFC definition, hydropower 
plants can be labeled green, “only if net emission reductions can be demonstrated.” Especially in the 
Americas, it is not clear whether all the cleaner energy projects in the region could be classified as 
green.  If none of the hydro projects were great there would be just over $4 billion in cleaner energy 
finance-relative to the $14.6 billion including hydropower.  
This stipulation is not to be taken lightly, especially in the Latin American case where tropical hydro-
electric projects have long been associated with increases in methane emissions and emissions from 
associated deforestation. Comprehensive reviews of estimates find that tropical hydroelectric plants 
tend to emit 7 to 15 times more emissions than non-tropical hydropower, and 2 to 3 times more 
emissions than gas, oil, or coal plants (Barro et al, 2011; Steinhurst et al, 2012). This is due to the fact 
that methane emissions are more potent from tropical dams, and because new roads and infrastructure 
sprout as a result of new dams and can cause further carbon emitting deforestation (Fearnside 1997, 
2012, 2015).  For instance, there are a number of hydroelectric dams planned for implementation 
along Brazil’s Tapajos River.  While the impact of these dams on site may not be significant in terms 
of net emissions through deforestation, it has been estimated that the project would indirectly trigger 
the deforestation of 950,000 hectares by 2032 given that the project will spur the establishment of 
extensive new roads through the Amazon rainforest.  As will be discussed in section 5, hydroelectric 
power projects have been widely shown to be the source of other environmental and social problems 
beyond climate change such as loss of water and habitat, the displacement of people and indigenous 
livelihoods, and beyond (Laurance et al, 2015).   
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Table 4: Selected Cleaner Energy Projects
*Private sector lending
**USD 250 millions public lending and USD 200 millions private sector lending. 
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
Chinese development banks are the largest investors into hydroelectric projects, not only in terms of 
the total lending amount but also in terms of the largest individual projects. The financing agreement 
signed between China and Argentina for the Nestor Kirchner and Jorge Cepernic hydroelectric dams 
set a record of $4.7 billion, which will be financed by three Chinese banks.  The large Coco-Codo-
Sinclair project in Ecuador shown in Table 4 is one such project where concerns have been raised 
over the extent to which it will yield a significant increase in emissions from indirect deforestation 
and even more so related to the social and local environmental problems that may arise (International 
Rivers, 2012). 
As shown in Table 4 there are a number of notable renewable energy investments in the region 
outside of the hydro-electric sector--though of the more than $14 billion in cleaner energy invested 
into the region by IDBs, just over $4 billion has been in renewable energy beyond the hydropower 
sector.  Overall, the World Bank and KfW invest the most in wind, solar, energy efficiency across the 
Americas.  While quite small, the IADB has innovative programs to provide off-grid renewable energy 
access to remote an indigenous communities in the Ecuadoran Amazon (IDB, 2015a). 
The KfW has initiated some notable co-financing relationships with developing country-led banks 
as well.   In 2014, KfW provided a loan of $335 million to BNDES to finance wind parks in Brazil. This 
cooperation between the BNDES and KfW aims to mitigate climate change by supporting renewable 
energy projects. Similar operations were also carried out in previous years, such as KfW’s donation of 
€21 million to the Amazon Fund (BNDES, 2014). A similar collaboration has occurred between CAF 
and KfW: during 2011-2013 KfW granted $500 million in credit lines to CAF to support sustainable 
development by financing projects in renewable energy, energy efficiency, transportation, and water 
and sanitation (CAF, 2013).
Another interesting co-finance partnership has been formed between the IADB and the People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC), China’s central bank.  Called the China Co-financing Fund for Latin America and 
the Caribbean, it was founded in 2013 to “to support public and private sector projects that promote 
sustainable economic growth in the region” (IADB, 2013).  In 2015 the fund provided $216 million in 
support for the construction of the Colonia Arias and Valentines wind farms, each with a capacity to 
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Year Bank Country Project Amount 
(USD Millions) 
2014 CDB Argentina Nestor Kirchner& Jorge Cepernic Hydroelectric Dam 2,499 
2014 CHEXIM Ecuador Coca-Codo-Sinclair Hydroelectric Dam 1,683 
2014 IADB Chile Arica Solar PV Project* 111 
2014 IADB Mexico Geothermal Financing and Risk Transfer Program 86 
2014 KFW Brazil Support for Wind Power Projects  335 
2013 EIB Costa Rica Extension of a Geothermal Power Generating Plant 69 
2013 IADB & KFW Mexico Program for Renewable Energies, Energy Efficiency and 
Environmental Protection (EcoCasa) 
IADB: 100 & 
KfW:105 
2012 IADB Costa Rica Reventazon Hydropower Project (Costa Rica, 2012) 450** 
2011 AFD Mexico 
Support for the Federal Electricity Commission's Clean 
Energy Investment Program 129 
2011 USEXIM Mexico Nuclear Fuel Rods and Other Power Equipment 65 
2008 KFW Brazil Solar World Cup 2014 Minas Gerais 15 
2007 CAF Venezuela Manuel Piar Hydoelectric Plant Project 600 
 
generate 70 MW (IADB, 2015b).
4.1.2 Sustainable Transport 
Financing for sustainable infrastructure is also notable in LAC, representing $10.2 billion.  According 
to the IDFC, sustainable infrastructure refers to loans that support urban mass transportation 
and related activity (IDFC, 2014a). This area has gained popularity in LAC recently along with the 
increasing efforts to increase urban mobility through constructing Bus/Rapid Transit (BRT) and metro 
systems. Main lenders were the IADB, CAF and World Bank as they have been playing a proactive 
role in promoting sustainable urban development in this area for some time. 
Although many countries in LAC have made some progress in improving and modernizing their 
infrastructure, the region still faces an enormous infrastructure gap. IDB’s investments in sustainable 
infrastructure may play an important leveraging role in attracting private investment besides filling 
the gap. The region has a long history of incorporating public-private partnership (PPP) in large-scale 
infrastructure projects, such as the flagship Transmilenio project in Bogota, Colombia. The IFC claims 
that for every dollar invested in climate related projects such as these can mobilize an additional 3-4 
dollars from other private sources (IFC, 2013). 
Table 5: Selected Sustainable Transport Projects
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
Between 1996 and 2012 the CAF engaged in a notable set of sustainable infrastructure projects in 
Guayaquil, Ecuador.  Referred to as a “Cities of the Promise” project, CAF provided upwards of $515 
to help complete a broad group of urban transportation projects including the modernization of the 
Metrovia rapid transit system, a new sewage system that reached some of the most marginalized 
people in the city (IDFC, 2014).  The CAF and the IADB have also worked to finance sustainable 
transport in Lima and beyond. 
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Year Bank Country Project 
Amount 
(USD millions) 
2014 CHEXIM Argentina Buenos Aires Metro Line A 162 
2014 IADB Peru Lima Metro Line 2 and Line 4 300 
2013 IADB Ecuador Quito Metropolitan Urban Transportation System 100 
2012 AFD Brazil Mass Transit Policy in Rio de Janeiro State 384 
2011 CAF Panama Panama Metro Project 400 
2011 CAF Peru Lima Mass Transportation System 300 
2011 World Bank Colombia 
Support to the National Urban Transit Program 
Project 
350 
2010 
World Bank & 
IADB Brazil Sao Paulo Metro Line 5 Project 
WB: 650 & 
IADB: 481 
2009 BNDES Venezuela Caracas Metro Line 2 528 
2009 CAF Peru The first stage of Transit Plan for the city of Lima 300 
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Box 2: Development Banks and Green Bonds in Latin America  
Given the political difficulties of increasing the capital base of development banks, many governments and 
IDBs have attempted to leverage more private capital through various financial instruments. Green bonds are 
widely acknowledged as an innovative instrument to channel private investment into environmentally friendly 
projects. According to the Climate Bond Initiative, green bonds are defined as “bonds or debt securities specifically 
issued to finance environmental protection, sustainability or specific climate mitigation and adaptation measures.” 
Projects in areas including energy efficiency, renewable energy, climate change, water and sanitation, and 
sustainable urban development all can be labeled as “green” and can be financed by green bonds.  
 In 2007, the EIB issued the world’s first green bonds: “Climate Awareness Bonds” with a value of €600 
million. In 2008, the WORLD BANK issued its own green bonds. In the later years, more multilateral and national 
development banks have started to issue their green bonds and corporates have also joined the market since 2013. 
In LAC, the Peruvian wind energy producer Energía Eólica SA became the first Latin American green bonds issues 
in December 2014 by issuing a US$ 204 million green project bond with a coupon of 6 percent and a 20-year tenure 
(Kidney, 2015). In terms of financial features, green bonds are almost identical to other bonds. In particular, the 
yields of green bonds are no less than normal bonds. Currently, green bonds are more common at the portfolio 
level, meaning that private investors are guaranteed by the credit of a bank or a corporation. Another issue that 
pertains to green bonds is the “green” identification, that is to say, how to identify and qualify a project could be 
financed by green bonds. Currently, there are no generally accepted standards in this area and many issuers apply 
the Green Bond Principals (GBP), a set of voluntary guidelines developed by International Capital Market 
Association 
Among the 11 banks in our study, four banks have issued green bonds. EIB and the World Bank are pioneers 
in the market while AFD and KfW are among largest global issuers.  The four banks accounted for 45 percent of the 
entire global market, at $27 billion. The World Bank has lent $3.5 billion to LAC with capital raised through green 
bonds. 
According to Climate Bond Initiative, by the end of 2014, the total amount of green bonds outstanding was 
$53.2 billion. In 2015, market growth is expected at the same rate as 2014, projected at $100 billion in green bond 
issuance by December 31, 2015 (Climate Bond Initiative , 2015).  As in the case of green financial flow tracking 
however, little work is done in monitoring or tracking the actual environmental performance of green bond 
projects. 
Representative projects in LAC funded by World Bank Green Bonds  
Year Country Project Amount  
(USD mil.) 
2014 Belize Climate Resilient Infrastructure 30 
2014 Brazil Climate Resilient Infrastructure 30 
2013 Brazil Sao Paulo State Sustainable Transport 300 
2013 Ecuador EC Manta Public Services Improvement Project 100 
2013 Peru National Agricultural Innovation 13 
2012 Brazil Greening Rio de Janeiro Urban Rail Transit 600 
2012 Mexico Mexico Forests and Climate Change Program 350 
2012 Mexico Modernization of National Meteorological Services for Improved Climate Adaptation 105 
2011 Brazil Federal Integrated Water 107 
2011 Colombia Support to the National Urban Transit Program Project 650 
2011 Jamaica Energy Security and Efficiency Enhancement 15 
2011 Peru Second Rural Electrification 50 
2011 Uruguay Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Climate Change 49 
2010 Brazil Integrated Solid Waste and Carbon Finance 50 
2010 Mexico Efficient Lighting and Appliances 251 
2010 Mexico Urban Transport Transformation Program 150 
2009 Mexico Sustainable Rural Development 100 
2008 Dominican Republic  Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management 100 
Source: World Bank Green Projects 
4.2 Climate Adaptation 
Development finance for climate adaptation is lacking in LAC.  According to the IDFC methodology, 
climate adaptation activities aim to reduce the vulnerability and/or to increase country resilience to 
climate change impacts. LAC, and especially the Caribbean, is fairly vulnerable to climate change due 
to its large coastal territories and complex ecosystems. However, external funding for climate change 
adaptation has been relatively scarce: only one-seventh of the amount spent on mitigation projects 
in the past 10 years (Maplecroft 2014). Our analysis is consistent with this finding. In our project 
database, the amount of finance for mitigation projects is five times that of adaptation projects. CaDB 
had the largest percentage of total green finance in climate adaptation, with most projects to help 
member countries to manage natural disasters. This is not surprising given that many Caribbean 
countries are under high climate change risks. 
In fact, 33 percent of the IDBs’ adaptation finance was aimed at disaster prevention and management, 
ranging from institution strengthening to increasing social and infrastructure resilience. Besides 
CaDB, the World Bank, IADB and CAF provided the majority of funding to this area. Finance for other 
adaptation activities, such as agriculture, ecosystems, fishery adaptation, was less common. 
Table 6: Selected Climate Adaptation Projects
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
4.3 Water and Sanitation
Water and sanitation projects top the list of green finance allocations by development banks in LAC. 
More than a quarter of green finance flowed into areas such as water supply, waste management, 
water preservation, sanitation etc. These projects generally have two approaches. The first is to extend 
water and sanitation infrastructure, which contributes to increasing access to basic services of the 
population in the region. The second is to manage and upgrade the core water supplies themselves.
According to the World Bank, LAC possesses nearly 31 percent of the world’s freshwater, making the 
region the richest on earth in terms of freshwater availability per person. Latin America’s water wealth 
is not evenly distributed however—with wide inequalities in water supply and sanitation services 
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Year Bank Country Project Amount 
(USD Millions) 
2014 IADB Jamaica 
Adaptation Program and Financing Mechanism for the 
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) Jamaica 10 
2014 
World 
Bank Belize Climate Resilient Infrastructure 30 
2013 AFD Mexico Support for Agriculture to Fight Climate Change 49 
2012 IADB Panama 
Program to Reduce Vulnerability to Natural Disaster 
and Climate Change II 100 
2012 WB Mexico Strengthening Social Resilience to Climate Change 300 
2011 CAF Bolivia Natural Disaster Prevention Program 42 
2009 CaDB St Lucia Caribbean Natural Catastrophe Insurance 20 
2009 CAF 
Dominican 
Republic 
Improving the Quality of Housing and Reduce 
Vulnerability to Natural Hazards in a Population of 
Over 18,500 Low-income Residents. 
80 
2008 CaDB Jamaica 
Natural Disaster Management Kingston Metropolitan 
Area Drainage Rehabilitation Work 30 
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between urban and rural areas.  Furthermore, the increasing urban population has also put water supply 
and waste treatment services under pressure. Development banks have been seeking to fill this gap, 
and a number of illustrative examples in this area are exhibited in Table 7.  For instance, the coverage 
of sanitation services in the provinces of the Norte Grande region of Argentina was only 40 percent, 
much lower than the national level; and the water supply also faced problems such as unavailability of 
freshwater, discontinuity and low quality. To mitigate these problems, the IADB invested $500 million 
in the Norte Grande in order to increase the coverage and improve water and sanitary services in 
unserved and underserved areas, at the same time, to enhance the efficiency in sector entities and 
service providers (IADB, Project AR-L1136).  
Table 7: Selected Water and Sanitation Projects
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
In terms of the second approach of managing water resources, IDBs initiated projects that directly 
target the abundant water sources in LAC. These projects often help to restore the quality of water 
through increasing the control and treatment of the waste discharged into water resources, for 
example, the environmental sanitation program of the IADB for municipalities in the Guanabara Bay 
Area in Brazil  (Table 7). Furthermore, environmental sanitation is sometimes combined with social 
inclusion programs, as CAF allocated $275 million in Ecuador in 2013 to attend to the basic needs of 
the poorest populations of the country. 
BNDES is another example.  In 2010, BNDES subscribed to USD 330 million corporate bonds in a 
private issue to support Companhia de Saneamento de Minas Gerais’a (COPASA) plans to enlarge 
water treatment and sanitation plants in Brazil. The specific issuance also hopes to foster the 
reduction of energy and chemicals use and waste and support reforestation and conservation efforts 
(IDFC, 2014).
4.4 Conventional projects
Conventional energy and infrastructure projects comprise 32 percent of all IDB finance in LAC, 
over $100 billion of the total and more than 1.6 times larger than all green finance in the region. 
Development banks still place a large emphasis on financing the region’s rich supplies of oil and gas 
at both the upstream and downsteam stages.  Development banks also continue to support the coal 
Year Bank Country Project Amount 
(USD Millions) 
2013 CAF Ecuador Environmental Sanitation Program for Community Development 275 
2013 IADB Mexico Sustainability of Water Supply for Rural Communities 450 
2012 IADB Argentina Development Programme's Norte Grande provinces: Water & Sanitation Infrastructure 500 
2011 IADB Brazil Environmental Sanitation Program for Municípios in the Guanabara Bay Area-PSAM 452 
2010 CAF Ecuador Environmental sanitation program for community development 300 
2009 CAF Argentina Program to support public investment in the water supply and sanitation sectors 275 
2009 IADB Brazil Tiete River Cleanup Program, Stage III 600 
2009 IADB Colombia Medellin River Sanitation Program - Phase II 450 
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sector in the region.
4.4.1 Conventional Energy
Financing for conventional energy still outweighs green energy finance in LAC by IDBs by 160 
percent with oil and gas dominating the field.   According to the IDFC, conventional energy has three 
components: electricity distribution, oil and gas, and coal power generation. Oil and gas are still the 
most attractive resources for IDBs in LAC and they accounted for more than 73 percent of the total 
loans in energy (green and conventional). US EXIM Bank and the two Chinese banks have the most 
dominant positions in hydrocarbon investments. Indeed, CDB is also the biggest lender in the area, 
with a share of 45 percent. Expanding electricity transmission and upgrading electricity grid shared 
a quarter of total loans. There are still 29 million households in the region that do not have access to 
electricity and outages are not rare in many areas. Between 2010 and 2013, more than 5 billion was 
invested to increase access to electricity and the bulk of commitments were made by the IADB and 
CAF.  Furthermore, although financing for coal-fired power plants only represents 2 percent of the 
total, the fact that the IADB and CAF financed six coal plants (Table 9) is to be noted, as IDBs have 
received strong criticism for financing “dirty energy” and many have stopped providing loans to coal 
power generation. The CDB has entered into a $430 million loan agreement with Petrobras, financing 
the Candiota coal plant (Electrobras, 2015).
Figure 6: Conventional Energy by Bank 2007-14
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database.
The top 10 conventional energy projects were financed by four banks: CDB, USEXIM, CAF and 
CHEXIM. The greatest lending was made by CDB to finance Petrobras’ pre-salt oil operations in 2009. 
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In fact, CDB disbursed another $5 billion to Petrobras early in 2015. The largest loan provided by 
USEXIM went to support oil refining in Colombia, and the commitments in Mexico were all long-term 
guarantees for the Pemex Project Funding Master Trust.
Table 8: Top 10 Conventional Energy Project
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
Another issue pertains to coal-power plants. US President Barack Obama issued an executive order 
announcing that the US would stop financing coal plants in 2013.  Many MDBs in the US have followed 
the Treasury’s guidance to end their “support of public financing of new coal plants overseas, except 
under very limited circumstances” (US Department of the Treasury , 2013). The World Bank and EIB 
followed the new policy in the same year introducing new energy policy and standard to cut their 
financing of coal plants. Recently, France confirmed its plan to end the financing of coal plant, despite 
not mentioning a specific timeline. On the other hand, KfW continues to finance coal plants and along 
with IADB, CAF and other banks. Table 9 lists coal-fired power plant operations in our project sample, 
and shows that CAF was the largest financier of coal plants in the region.
Table 9: Coal Power Plant Projects Financed by IDBs 2007-14
*Private sector financing 
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
Year Bank Country Project Amount 
(USD million) 
2009 CDB Brazil Exploit Pre-salt Oil Fields 10,000 
2013 CDB Venezuela Increase Sinovensa Production in Orinoco 4,020 
2011 US EXIM Colombia Engineering Services and Equipment for Refinery 2,344 
2013 US EXIM Mexico Equipment and Services for Oil-Field and Gas-Field 1,500 
2012 US EXIM Mexico Equipment and Services for Oil and Gas Projects 1,200 
2014 US EXIM Mexico Equipment and Services for Oil-Field and Gas-Field 1,000 
2009 CAF Venezuela Thermoelectric Project Termozulia III 600 
2009 US EXIM Mexico Oil-Field and Gas-Field Equipment 600 
2014 CHEXIM Ecuador Finance the Power Transmission System for Coca-
Codo-Sinclair Hydropower Plant 
509 
2010 CAF Argentina 
Pico Truncado-Rió Turbio-Rió Gallegos-Calafate, 
Extra High Tension Line of 500 KV 
500 
2010 CAF Venezuela 
Program to Strengthen the National Electric 
System 
500 
  Subtotal    22,773 
   Percentage of total financing  7% 
 
Year Bank Country Project Amount 
(US Million) 
2014 CAF Venezuela Termozulia II New Project 60 
2010 CAF Venezuela Termozulia III Plant Project (second loan) 165 
2010 CDB Brazil President Medici (Candiota) Power Station 430 
2009 IADB Brazil Pécem Thermoelectric Power Plant Project* 147 
2009 IADB Brazil TermoMaranhao Thermoelectric Power Plant Project* 50 
2009 CAF Venezuela Thermoelectric Project Termozulia III 600 
2007 CAF Uruguay Punta del Tigre Coal Plant 28 
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4.4.2 Conventional Infrastructure
Conventional infrastructure projects amounted for 18 percent of total commitments, and CDB, IDB 
and CAF are the three largest lenders. The CDB is the largest lender to conventional infrastructure 
projects in the region though we labeled most of its lending as traditional instead of sustainable infra-
structure because there is not sufficient enough information on the projects. For example, at least $28 
billion in oil-backed loans from CDB to Venezuela was to finance infrastructure ranging from public 
transit to housing. Furthermore, part of the $10 billion loan to revamp Argentina’s railway system in 
2010 could also be redeemed as “green and sustainable” because the project would help to improve 
the efficiency of the railway system. However, due to lack of information, it is very hard to assess the 
sustainability of the Chinese lending and therefore, we believe the actual lending profile of CDB may 
deserve more green credit. 
Figure 7: Conventional Infrastructure by Bank 2007-14
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
Interestingly, these 10 infrastructure projects represent 82 percent of total loans in this area, because 
such projects tend to be quite large. Chinese banks provided the bulk of lending, while the IADB fi-
nanced 2 projects. However, although some individual CDB loans were extremely large, they usually 
financed multiple projects. But due to lack of access to the full loan portfolio, we could not access 
detailed information about those projects. 
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Table 10: Top 10 Conventional Infrastructure Projects
Source: Respective annual reports and official databases; Chinese source: China-Latin America Finance Database
This section of the study has revealed the extent to which IDBs have provided green finance in LAC. 
IDBs have a solid record from which to build upon in this area, with 20 percent of total finance already 
designated as green finance.  The region is also witnessing a number of promising experiments in co-
financing, green bonds, and other ways to finance sustainable development—including through the 
establishment of a 100 percent green bank in the North American Development Bank.  However, de-
velopment banks will have to move from this pilot phase to help fill the infrastructure and sustainabil-
ity gaps in the region.  Moreover, in order to truly meet the objectives of social and environmentally 
sustainable economic growth in the region, IDBs and host country governments will do well to ensure 
that all IDB projects, green or otherwise, maintain social and environmental integrity.  
5. Safeguarding Sustainable Development? LAC Deve-
lopment Finance in Comparative Perspective
Green finance pertains to those loans that are directly intended to improve the environment, reduce 
emissions, or help people and ecosystems adapt to changing environments.  However, virtually every 
project of significant scale—even those classified as green—may face a number of social and environ-
mental implications.  Whether a project is a large wind farm in Mexico, a hydroelectric power plant in 
Brazil, or oil exploration in Ecuador, new development finance can have adverse impacts on people, 
ecosystems, and economies.  
To mitigate the risks associated with environmentally sensitive projects many development banks 
have established their own environmental and social polices for various aspects of the project cy-
cle.  Commonly referred to as “environment and social safeguards (ESS),” they have been defined 
as “rules or institutions that help ensure that investments meet minimum social, environmental, and 
Year Bank Country Project Amount 
($ Million) 
2010 CDB Venezuela 
Funding Infrastructure: electricity, heavy industry, 
housing, agriculture projects 20,000 
2010 CDB Argentina Revamping Argentina's Train Systems 10,000 
2007 CDB Venezuela Funding Infrastructure, Other Projects 4,000 
2008 CDB Venezuela 
Funding Infrastructure, including the Simon Bolivar 
Satellite, Light Rail, Trains, and Highways 
4,000 
2014 CDB Venezuela Joint Fund to Build Infrastructure 4,000 
2013 CDB Argentina Belgrano Cargas Train Line 2,100 
2011 CDB Venezuela Abreu e Lima Refinery Construction 1,500 
2007 IADB Argentina Norte Grande Roads 1,200 
2011 IADB Brazil Mario Covas Rodoanel Project - Northern Section 1,149 
2014 CHEXIM Venezuela 
Mineral Exportation, Construction of a New Cement 
Factory and the Purchase of 1,500 Chinese Buses 
1,000 
Subtotal     48,949 
Percentage of total financing  16% 
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governance standards.  These rules and institutions can come from a recipient country or the inves-
tor” (Larson and Ballesteros, 2014, 16).  
Based on our analysis of ESS across IDBs in LAC, it is not clear that development finance is adequately 
safeguarded in the region.  While virtually every bank in our sample is engaged in potentially high im-
pact projects, ESS across development banks range from a required set of international standards to 
complete deference to the national country systems of borrowing nations.  While the most stringent 
ESS have been criticized for bogging down the project cycle and turning potential borrowers away 
from certain MDBs, over-reliance on country systems can also result in costly delays, project shut-
downs, and tainted reputations for IDBs.  
In order to accelerate the scale of green finance and sustainable infrastructure, it is paramount that 
IDBs have systems in place to help anticipate and mitigate adverse impacts of such projects.  A study 
by the World Bank found that large energy and infrastructure projects were 37 percent more likely to 
pose significant environmental and social risks in developing countries (World Bank, 2010). Not only 
do well-safeguarded projects help IDBs fulfill their ultimate goals of sustainable and inclusive devel-
opment, but they help identify risk and protect the bottom line.  
5.1 Major Challenges Lie Ahead
A major increase in infrastructure finance, both green and conventional, is essential for Latin Ameri-
ca’s continued prosperity.  However, as articulated in the sustainable development goals to “develop 
quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-border infra-
structure, to support economic development and human wellbeing, with a focus on affordable and 
equitable access for all (United Nations, 2015),” it is also imperative that such finance be directed in 
a manner that is socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable.  It is not clear that IDB finance in 
LAC will be consistent with these goals.  According to our analysis above, more than 53 percent IDB 
development finance between 2007 and 2014 went into fossil-fuel intensive and conventional infra-
structure projects that will accelerate global climate change, urban air pollution, and land-use change, 
as well as impacting local livelihoods. 
Yet even green finance can be associated with significant social and environment risk—including but 
not limited to hydroelectric power plants. Some of the largest projects in the region, both green and 
conventional, have been identified as high risk in terms of the potential impacts on people and the 
environment.  A large swath of new projects will be conducted by China’s development banks and will 
take place in some of the most sensitive ecological and peopled places on the planet.  Table 11 lists 7 
relatively large projects in LAC, which would all be considered green by IDFC standards, but which are 
the subject of significant environmental and social concerns.
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Table 11: Environmentally Sensitive Projects
Source: IADB,various years; Derechos Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, 2014; Bank Information Center, 2015.
It should be noted that many of these projects also significantly contribute to improving the economic 
and social welfare of nations and local people, both directly by use of the services and indirectly by 
granting access to education, jobs and health care.  However, large projects such as these also impose 
economic and environmental risks.  Many of these projects lock the region into a resource extractive 
economic model that has long been susceptible to boom and bust cycles that have plagued the re-
gion’s development prospects for centuries (Bertola and Ocampo, 2012). 
Infrastructure expansion such as paving roads to wilderness areas often generates severe impacts on 
ecosystems and species, ranging from deforestation to illegal mining and land speculation (Laurance 
et al.,2015). Projects related to natural resource exploitation have similar environmental impacts. 
Huge changes caused by large dams can lead to the loss of aquatic biodiversity, massive costal ero-
sion and other problems. These environmental impacts are exacerbated when local regulations are 
relatively weak. For example, In the Brazilian Amazon, every kilometer of legal road in wilderness ar-
eas is often accompanied by three kilometers of illegal roads (Barber et al. 2014). Even improvement 
of existing roads and highways may exacerbate the negative impacts because better road conditions 
facilitalte more and faster traffic in sensitive areas, which in turn, increase the likelihood of road kill 
of animals (Benítez-López, Alkemade and Verweij, 2010; Laurance, Goosem and Laurance, 2009). 
Similar impacts can be found in large hydro plants and mining projects in remote areas, as they often 
need to construct road and power transmission networks. As noted earlier, it is estimated that the 
deforestation of Amazon will increase 950,000 hectares by 2032 due to the construction of 12 dams 
on the Tapajós River and their road networks (Barreto et al, 2014). 
The World Bank-backed Ixiamas-San Buenaventura road project has become the focus of significant 
concern.  Critics of the project worry that the project will increase deforestation and illegal logging 
in Bolivia, overfishing, a decrease in tourist revenue, and contamination of local waterways.  In ad-
dition, there are concerns that the project will trigger the displacement of indigenous peoples and 
erode traditional cultural values (Bank Information Center, 2015).  The Mareña Renovables wind farm 
in Oaxaca Mexico, financed by the IADB, has split local communities.  The project has been halted 
due to local protests on more than one occasion, even though there is significant support from some 
community members.  In 2014, members of two indigenous communities brought a petition of 2000 
signatures to the IADB demanding that the bank rescind its plans (Nauman, 2013).   
Figure 8 exhibits some of the largest planned projects financed by Chinese banks and companies 
that are planned over the coming half-decade.  Many projects financed by the CDB and CHEXIM are 
among the most sensitive.  Moreover, China and LAC have created a new $10 billion dollar joint fund 
to engage in these and other projects. Hydroelectric projects are the triangles, waterways the blue 
Year Bank Country Project Amount (USD Millions) 
2014 CHEXIM Ecuador Hydroelectric Dam Coca-Codo-Sinclair 1,683 
2012 BNDES Brazil Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam, Para. 10,800 
2011 World Bank Bolivia 
Ixiamas-San Buenaventura Road Project (National 
Roads and Infrastructure Project) 129 
2011 IADB Brazil Highway Mario Covas Rodoanel Project - Northern Section 1,149 
2010 CAF Peru Interoceanic Road Corridor Peru-Brazil (IIRSA Sur), Tranches 2, 3, and 4-Final Phase 200 
2009 IADB Mexico Mareña Renovables Windmills 72 
2008 CAF Peru Additional Works of the Southern Inter-Oceanic Road Corridor 300 
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of the map are the highly biodiverse and and the gold horizontal areas are concentrations of indig-
enous peoples.  As is starkly illuminated in this mapping exercise, many of these new planned and 
projected projects are occurring in some of the most socially and environmentally sensitive areas in 
LAC—and even the world.
Figure 8: New Chinese Projects, Biodiversity, and Indigenous People in LAC
Source:  Ray et al, 2015
One such project is the Twin-Ocean Railway, a railway that promises to connect the Pacific Ocean 
via Peru to the Atlantic Ocean via Brazil.  As shown in Figure 8, there are two potential routes, with 
the southern route expected to be more benign to people and the environment.  Such a railway would 
facilitate trade and investment for much of South America.  At present the region must rely on bur-
densome northern sea routes and the Panama Canal in order to get its products to its largest trading 
partner, China (Gallagher, 2016).  A new rail has the potential to vastly improve such trade and better 
integrate the region’s economies with each other as well.   However, the Northern route would cut 
through significantly biodiverse areas in the Andean mountains and in the Amazon region.  What is 
more, the project would impact some of the most remote and long lasting indigenous communities 
on earth.
Significant controversy has also surrounded the Coco-Coda Sinclair hydrolectric dam project.  On 
the one hand, Ecuador is to be credited for its effort to shift away from fossil fuels and increase the 
amount of renewable energy in the economy (Ray et al, 2015).  However, this particular dam, which 
is financed by CHEXIM, will partly dry Ecuador’s largest waterfall, the San Rafael Falls—which is a 
biologically diverse region between the Andes and the Amazon and located in the UNESCO Sumaco 
Biosphere Reserve (International Rivers, 2015). 
 
GREENING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN THE AMERICAS         |         bu.edu/gegi         |         12/2015 30
 
5.2: The Evolution of Development Banks’ Environmental and Social Safe 
guards
In the earlier days of development finance there was little to no formal incorporation of environmental 
and social considerations in project finance.  Beginning in the 1980s this began to change, and now 
such considerations form at least part of the decision-making process of virtually every IDB operating 
in LAC.
ESG policies date from the 1980s and early 1990s as local communities affected by projects paired 
with global NGOs to press governments and banks to incorporate social and environmental concerns 
into development banking.  Numerous books and articles have discussed the history and origins of 
these policies, and it is beyond the scope of this study to go into them in great detail.  Mikesell and 
William’s 1992 International Banks and the Environment provides an overview of the lack of adequate 
environmental consideration in project design by MDBs during the 1970s and 1980s, specifically 
noting the importance of the Polonoroeste project in Brazil and the Narmada dam project in India 
in raising global awareness of environmental concerns in project financing (see also Wade, 1997). 
Such projects unified environmental activists worldwide to lobby for changes in MDB policies in the 
1980s (Aufderheide and Rich 1988; Fox and Brown 1998, 51-80; Horberry 1985; Mikesell and Wil-
liams 1992). Aufderheide and Rich’s 1989 article “Environmental Reform and the Multilateral Banks” 
provides an account of the important role of NGOs in overcoming key bureaucratic challenges to 
implement effective environmental reform within MDBs during this stage.  This article also empha-
sized how international advocacy networks formed to advocate for the incorporation of safeguards in 
the project cycle—between local communities in host countries and global civil society organizations 
such as the Environmental Defense Fund.  These global advocacy campaigns have been noted as the 
key driver in changing World Bank policy on projects and the environment (Trócaire, 1990). 
During that era the U.S. Congress held hearings that eventually led to the passage of the “Pelosi 
Amendment” in 1989 to address concerns regarding the environmental impact of development aid 
projects by the World Bank (Aufderheide and Rich 1988; Babb 2009, 186-196; Horberry; Mikesell and 
Williams 1992).  This additional provision within the International Development and Finance Act of 
1989 tied funding to “review the potential environmental impacts of development projects for which 
they provide funding and to make these environmental assessments publicly available” (Bank Infor-
mation Center). With the United States as a controlling shareholder and major contributor of funding 
to MDBs, this requirement led to significant restructuring of international financial institution (IFI) 
practices and has been credited with refocusing the role of MDBs’ aid to more sustainable develop-
ment practices (Babb 2009, 186-196; Bank Information Center; Park 2010; Rich 1995). 
Continued pressure from NGOs has further changed the World Bank’s and other MDBs’ account-
ability and transparency practices.  Bruce Rich’s 1994 Mortgaging the Earth provides a critique of the 
World Bank’s lending practices and bureaucratic inefficiencies and pushes for greater accountability 
and transparency.  Fox and Brown’s 1998 The Struggle for Accountability documents MDBs’ respons-
es to NGO and grassroots organization social and environmental critiques and the effectiveness of 
such NGOs and grassroots organizations in holding MDBs accountable. Such works have provided a 
solid foundation for understanding the continued evolution of MDBs’ transparency and accountability 
practices to social and environmental norms. 
Hicks, Parks, Roberts, Tierney’s 2008 Greening Aid explores how the incorporation of such environ-
mental concerns has impacted development financing and project selection in leading development 
banks.  Analyzing data from 1980 to 1999, they find that funding for environmentally friendly aid 
projects grew significantly in both relative and dollar terms.  However, the value of environmentally 
unfriendly projects still outweighed the value of friendly ones threefold in 1999.  The World Bank’s 
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record has been criticized due to its continued investments in fossil-fuel intensive projects such as 
coal-fired power stations and oil and gas drilling (Jowit 2010; Swann 2008; Berger 2010). In response 
to such criticism, Roger Morier of the World Bank responded that coal plants were only subsidized 
when there were “exceptional circumstances where countries have few or no prospects for other 
energy sources” (Jowit 2010).  In 2013, the United States government issued an executive order limit-
ing the ability of the United States to participate in the financing of coal projects unless under similar 
circumstances and in 2014 issued a further executive order mandating that US development finance 
be climate resilient (US Treasury, 2013; 2014).  In 2014, the US Congress also passed legislation 
that included a provision whereby “The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States 
executive director of each international financial institution that it is the policy of the United States to 
oppose any loan, grant, strategy or policy of such institution to support the construction of any large 
hydroelectric dam, (Brossard, 2014).
Also in response to civil society pressure in the 1980s and 1990s, export credit agencies (ECAs) have 
moved to develop environmental and sustainable development standards for export credit supports. 
Through the auspices of the OECD, in 1998 ECAs made a statement of intent to develop such stan-
dards. In 1999, they agreed to “disclose environmental information for big projects.”  In the face of 
further scrutiny ECAs from industrialized countries created a broader but voluntary set of “common 
approaches.” Under further pressure, a statement of voluntary Common Approaches was drafted in 
late 2001 and became mandatory in 2003. The latest review of the Common Approaches was under-
taken in 2012. The new standards emerging from that process are benchmarked against the World 
Bank Safeguard Policy and IFC Performance Standards and apply to projects that are officially granted 
export credits with a payment period of more than two years. “The objectives of the Common Ap-
proaches are to increase environmental and social awareness in the buyer countries and to harmonize 
the environmental and social assessment procedure to be applied by all ECAs (Export Credit Agen-
cies) in order to avoid any distortion of competition” (OECD, 2012,5). 
This global focus on environmental and socially responsible investment practices has led to private 
sector standards for overseas operations as well, dating to a public-private finance initiative between 
the United National Environmental Program and the private banking sector in 1991. This initiative was 
later expanded to the insurance and reinsurance industry in 1995 (United Nations). As a result of 
this collaboration and growing pressure from non-governmental organizations, the private banking 
sector created the Equator Principles in July 2006. These principles incorporate World Bank prac-
tices and guidelines and are voluntarily adopted and applied to projects with over US$10 million in 
capital costs. For adopting institutions, these principles are a “credit risk management framework for 
determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions” 
(Equator Principles 2006). Although non-binding, the requirement for annual public reporting of its 
implementation of these principles ensures some level of transparency (Wright, 2012). Currently, 
there are 80 adopting institutions, covering over 70 percent of international project finance debt in 
emerging markets (Equator Principles 2015).  In 2010, the Equator Principles began an internal review 
process to update and revise the principles to match the growing global demand for accountability 
and transparency of companies and organizations (Helleiner 2011; Herz and Ebrahim 2007; Wright 
2012).  As a result, the Equator Principles represent an additional mechanism to influence environ-
mentally responsible lending in both private and public sector banking (Wright 2012).
There has been a gradual shift to work with borrowing countries to enable them to take more owner-
ship over such policies.  A common complaint from World Bank borrowers has been that ESS have 
been strictly imposed on countries with little to no capacity building components.  A client of the 
World Bank reported that “The Bank always considers safeguard policies superior to the country’s 
own laws and systems, reflecting lack of trust and undermining client ownership.  With support from 
the government of Japan, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), part of the World 
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Bank Group, has set up an environmental and social trust fund that helps fund capacity building in 
Africa for borrowing countries to adapt to ESS (World Bank, 2010).  This is part of a relatively new 
effort to respect national ‘country systems’ for social and environmental protection (ADB, 2014).
In addition, a number of national and sub-regional development banks have adopted their own sets 
of safeguards and environmental policies.  As will be noted later in this section of the study, the CAF 
has created a mix of policies pertaining to international standards and deference to national country 
systems in its projects.  Moreover, the CAF has created a climate change division and finances a con-
siderable amount of green infrastructure.  The CHEXIM has also adapted a set of environmental and 
social guidelines for overseas operations (Garzon, 2015).
A burgeoning set of new thinking attempts a more integrative approach to incorporating social and 
environmental concerns throughout the entire project cycle, including in the initial project design 
stages and especially in the infrastructure sector.  ‘Sustainable Infrastructure’ efforts are underway to 
define, measure, and monitor the sustainability of infrastructure projects.  A variety of initiatives are 
underway at development banks and in the private sector that attempt to incorporate sustainability 
throughout the infrastructure project cycle, such as the Infrastructure Sustainability Rating Tool in 
Australia, the Civil Engineering and Environmental Quality Assessment and Award Scheme in the UK, 
and the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol of the International Hydropower Associa-
tion.  Drawing on this work, the IADB is developing a Sustainable Infrastructure Framework (Watkins, 
2014).  
5.3 Comparative Analysis of ESS in Latin America 
To what extent are ESS part of the project cycle in the numerous development banks in LAC?  Along-
side our quantitative analysis on green finance we also conduct a comparative review to examine the 
variation of environmental safeguards across the development banks in our sample.  Drawing on con-
cepts of standards in international trade law, we put forth a classification system to characterize the 
different approaches to ESS in our sample.  In international trade law, “harmonization of standards” 
applies to international pacts where two parties agree to a common set of standards, where one 
country often must increase its level of standards in order to comply.  Although the eventual aim may 
be the harmonization of standards, “mutual recognition” is another principle in international law seen 
as cases where parties respect and recognize differences in the parties’ law and regulation yet require 
that such norms be enforced (Sykes, 1995).  We find a spectrum of approaches to ESS by develop-
ment banks in LAC, and depict those approaches in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: IDB Safeguards in Latin America and the Caribbean
 
On the left side of the spectrum are the large MDBs and Western national development banks and 
export credit agencies.  On the right are emerging market and developing country development banks 
and export credit agencies, both national and sub-regional.  By and large, the industrialized country-
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dominated banks on the left of the spectrum have adopted a set of international standards and proce-
dures that are required for all projects of a certain level of finance and perceived risk.  
The KfW, AFD, CAF, and CaDB also address some international standards and procedures, but have 
a more flexible approach with respect to incorporating and enforcing ESS into the project cycle.  The 
CaDB stands as an example of an approach that is largely deferential to host country standards but 
that also brings in some international standards.  Moreover, if the CaDB determines that the borrow-
ing country is lacking capacity to enforce its own standards for the project, the CaDB provides techni-
cal and sometimes financial assistance to upgrade the performance of the project and build capacity 
in the host state.
 “1.02 All operation activities must comply with the directives of the ESRP as well as all oth-
er relevant Bank policies and operational guidelines. Projects are also required to demon-
strate compliance with the Borrower’s national legislation and regulations for environment 
and social requirements, pollution abatement and control and health and safety issues. If 
an appropriate legislative or regulatory framework is weak or absent, the Bank will work 
with the Borrower to determine the most appropriate requirements to be used given the 
nature of the project, the national context and internationally accepted norms and prac-
tices. CDB will assist in strengthening BMC’s capacity to manage environment and social 
issues, either through discrete technical assistance (TA) or the inclusion of specific capac-
ity building components in the design of programms or projects (Caribbean Development 
Bank, 2008, 1.02) 
The third tier of ESS are what we term “Deferential recognition” where the IDB recommends that the 
project comply with domestic country systems but does not necessarily monitor project compliance 
or provide assistance to countries that lack the full capabilities of compliance.  An example of this 
approach is the CHEXIM, which states, “The host country’s environmental policies and standards are 
the basis for evaluation. Offshore projects of the host country should abide by the requirements of 
their laws and regulations and obtain corresponding environmental permits. When the host country 
does not have a complete environmental protection mechanism or lacks environmental and social 
impact assessment policy and standards, we should refer to our country’s standards or international 
practices” (CHEXIM,2007 , Article 12(4) ). The CDB and the BNDES have a completely deferential 
set of ESS, guiding project participants to adhere to host country systems but refraining from active 
monitoring of the project cycle to ensure country systems are adequately met. 
Table 12: Thematic Coverage 
  Pollution 
Prevention 
Biodiversity/ 
Natural 
Habitats 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
Right of 
Indigenous 
Peoples 
Involuntary 
Resettlement 
(of people) 
Labor, 
Health, 
Safety 
Cultural 
Heritage 
World Bank X X X X X - X 
IDB X X X X X - X 
US EXIM X X X X X X X 
AFD X X X X X X X 
KFW X X X X X X X 
EIB X X X X X X X 
CaDB X X X X X X X 
CAF X X - X X - X 
CHEXIM X X - X X X X 
CDB X NA NA NA NA NA NA 
BNDES NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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We construct this spectrum based on an analysis of official documents in each bank, supplemented 
by interviews, the results of which are displayed in Tables 12 and 13.  According to the official docu-
ments of the various banks, the thematic coverage for EGS varies widely across IDBs, as can be seen 
in Table 12.  The difference resides in two areas: climate change and labor, health and security. Many 
banks have integrated climate change into their safeguard policies while CHEXIM and CAF have yet 
to do so. On the other hand, the policies of the World Bank, IDB and CAF do not cover labor issues. 
Moreover, as BNDES and CDB do not have a detailed document regarding the themes in environmen-
tal assessments, we could not include them in this comparison.
Table 13: Operational Procedure Requirements
Although the various IDBs have similar thematic structures, the procedures by which IDBs examine 
these themes vary more significantly across IDBs.  As shown in Table 13, all eleven banks apply ex-
ante and project review of environmental impact assessments at the pre-lending stage, and establish 
links between the compliance of environmental regulations and disbursement. Regarding environ-
mental standards, host countries environmental regulations are the bottom line for all banks, and 
the World Bank, IADB, US EXIM, EIB, AFD and KfW also require clients to comply with international 
standards and procedures as well. Put another way, the World Bank, IADB, US EXIM,EIB, AFD and 
KfW have mandated safeguard systems, whereas the rest of the sample defer or partially defer to 
country systems. 
All the banks except CDB and BNDES include public consultations with affected communities in their 
environmental assessments. Although CDB and BNDES do not have an explicit statement regard-
ing this issue, it does not mean they do not apply this requirement in implementation. For disputes 
on environmental issues, only three banks (World Bank, AFD and EIB) have project-level grievance 
mechanisms. During the project cycle, only the World Bank and US EXIM Bank require an indepen-
dent monitoring and review of the environmental compliance. The IADB, KfW and BNDES do not 
require ex-post assessment while the rest do have this requirement. 
Table 14 goes into much deeper detail for each bank’s safeguard system across four components: 
over-arching policy statements, operation requirements for borrowers, banks’ social and environ-
mental review procedures and information disclosure. 
 
  World 
Bank 
IADB US 
EXIM 
AFD KFW EIB CAF CaDB CHEXIM BNDES CDB 
Ex-ante Environmental Impact 
Assessments X X X X X X X X X X X 
Project Review of 
Environmental Impact 
Assessments 
X X X X X X X X X X X 
Industry-specific Social and 
Environmental Standards 
X X X - - - X - - X - 
Require Compliance with Host 
Country Regulations X X X X X X X X X X X 
Require Compliance with Int’l 
Environmental Regulations 
X X X X X X - - - - - 
Public Consultations with 
Affected Communities 
X X X X X X X X X - - 
Grievance Mechanism X - - X - X - - - - - 
Independent Monitoring and 
Review 
X - X - -  - - - - - 
Establishing Covenants Linked 
to Compliance 
X X X X X X X X X X X 
Ex-post Environmental Impact 
Assessments 
- - - X - X X X X - X 
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Over-arching policy statement refers to a hierarchical and integrated document of MDBs’ safeguard 
policies, which usually states the key objectives, policies, principals and institutional approach to po-
tential environmental and social impacts and risks (Himberg, 2015). In our sample, EIB, CAF, BNDES 
have integrated their social and environmental policies into a safeguard framework under a sustain-
ability strategy or policy, and AFD and CDB have addressed their key principles in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). However, other banks including the World Bank, IDB, USEXIM, KFW, CaDB and 
CHEXM are still lacking in an over-arching framework to organize their safeguard policies. 
Regarding operation requirements for borrowers and banks’ social and environmental review pro-
cedures, while the former describes requirements for borrowers to apply a loan, the latter states the 
bank’s internal procedures to approval a loan request. The operational policies and bank procedures 
of the World Bank and IFC have been widely referred as benchmark when IDBs establish their own 
safeguard system. Indeed, EIB, IADB, US EXIM, CaDB, KfW and AFD have aligned their safeguard 
policies with the World Bank policies, which are recognized as international standards. On the other 
hand, CHEXIM and BNDES have developed either guidelines or policies of their own to address en-
vironmental concerns. However, these policies cover very few specific requirements and hence, are 
less informative at operation level. According to the official website of BNDES, the bank is preparing 
more specific environmental policies. 
In the case of CDB, the statement of environmental policies is comparatively vague and general. Re-
viewing its annual sustainability report, we found that CDB’s environmental policies are still under 
development and have been progressing along with the increasing domestic awareness of environ-
mental problems. For instance, in the 2013 sustainability report, the “Sustainable Development in 
Action” focused on low-carbon development while in 2014, CDB emphasized green credit. We did 
not find a set of systemic policies on environmental risk management in project cycle. For the purpose 
of comparison, we referred to a “summary of environmental policy commitments of CDB” compiled 
by Friends of the Earth based on the CDB Bond Prospectus (2005) and the CDB Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reports of 2007, 2008 and 2009 (Annex A). 
It is worth noting that all Chinese banks, including development banks, can now follow a set of volun-
tary ‘Green Credit Guidelines’ that were put in place in 2012. The Green Credit Guidelines emphasized 
that Chinese financed projects should enhance social and environmental risk management to comply 
with local regulations. For overseas projects, the Green Credit Directive articulates that “the bank-
ing institutions shall make promise in public that appropriate international norms will be followed 
as far as such overseas projects are concerned, so as to ensure alignment with good international 
practices.” Moreover, these new polices also address procedural risk control through environmental 
assessment and monitoring, as well as important environmental themes such as pollution prevention, 
labor, biodiversity and affected local communities. 
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Table 14: Structure of Safeguard System
Source: Author’s adaptation from Himberg (2015).
Another important component of safeguard systems is information disclosure. Transparency is con-
sidered crucial for an effective safeguard system. Among the banks in our study, seven banks have 
transparency policies that guarantee access to environmental assessments of any party in interest. In 
fact, the level of transparency still varies among these banks. For example, environmental assessment 
reports of each project can be found in the project databases of the World Bank and IDB, while other 
banks only disclose this type of information upon request. Moreover, only the two Chinese banks and 
    Over-arching 
Policy Statement 
Operational 
Requirements for 
Borrowers/Clients 
Environmental and 
Social Review 
Procedures 
Access to 
Information Policy 
World Bank 
(2011) 
None Operational Policies Bank Procedures 
Access to 
Information Policy 
(2010) 
IADB (2006) 
None. 
Partially included 
in OP-703 
Operational Policies 
Implementation 
Guidelines for the 
Environment and 
Safeguards Compliance 
Policy and other 
safeguard policies 
Access to 
Information Policy 
(2010) 
 
 
US EXIM 
(2013) 
 
None Operational Policies 
Environmental and 
Social Due Diligence 
Procedures and 
Guidelines (2013) 
Ex-Im Bank FOIA 
Regulations  
CaDB (2008) None 
Environmental and social 
review process in the 
project cycle 
Environment and social 
review procedures 
Information 
disclosure policy 
(2011) 
EIB (2013) 
Statement of 
Environmental and 
Social Principles 
and Standards 
(2009) 
Environmental and Social 
Handbook (2013) 
Environmental and 
Social Practices and 
Procedures (2013) 
Transparency Policy 
(2011) 
CAF (2010) 
CAF’s 
Environmental 
Strategy 
Environmental and social 
safeguards applicable to 
CAF Operations 
Environmental and 
social aspects in the 
operations assessment 
process 
None 
KFW (2014) None Sustainability Guideline 
Environmental and 
social impact 
assessment and climate 
change assessment 
Transparency and 
participation (2014) 
AFD (2011)  
Environmental, 
Social and 
Governance 
Responsibility 
Policy Goals 
Guide to financing 
tenders in foreign 
countries (2011) 
Corporate responsibility 
in external operations 
Transparency in-
communications 
policy (2007) 
CHEXIM 
(2007) 
None 
Guidelines for 
Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessments 
Guidelines Chapter2, 
Article 13 
None 
BNDES 
(2010) 
Principals of Social 
and Environmental 
Policy 
Social and Environmental 
Analysis of Project 
Social and 
Environmental 
Guidelines 
Access to 
Information Law 
(2011) 
CDB (2013) 
Sustainable 
Development 
Strategy 
NA NA None 
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CAF lack such an information disclosure policy. 
Half of the IDBs in our study (the IADB, CaDB, USEXIM, EIB, KfW and AFD) have developed exclu-
sion criteria, or lists of projects or activities that they will not support through financial investments, 
to supplement the environmental safeguard policies. The World Bank implements the categorical 
exclusions through its Policy on Procurements as well as “Multilateral Development Bank Harmon-
ised Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the 
Employer” instead of a formal exclusion list (Himberg, 2015). CAF, BNDES and the two Chinese banks 
have not issued their own exclusion criteria. 
5.4 Benefits and Costs of Environmental and Social Safeguards
When designed properly, environmental and social safeguards (ESS) can bring significant benefits to 
the majority of stakeholders engaged in development bank projects.  ESS may also help development 
banks and host countries alike meet their broader development goals.  That said, in many circles ESS 
are perceived as being costly and onerous for borrowers.  A comprehensive comparative analysis of 
the benefits and costs of ESS across IDBs operating in LAC is beyond the scope of this study, but is 
sorely needed.  
It is clear that some IDBs, particularly the World Bank, have a long approval process and the World 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group has said that ESS are part of the delay and have a poor percep-
tion among some stakeholders.  On the other hand, ESS at other banks such as the IADB appear to 
have no impact on the length of the project cycle and may not be as costly.  Moreover, in independent 
cost-benefit analyses, even the World Bank’s perceived onerous safeguards were shown to outweigh 
the costs of implementation (World Bank, 2010).  
Table 15: Benefits of Environmental Safeguards
 
Source: Author’s adaptation from World Bank (2012)
ESS can bring benefits to a variety of actors in the development banking process.  Of course, develop-
ment banks that conduct projects with minimal harm to the environment and communities can better 
provide public goods and help allocate scarce natural and economic resources in a more efficient 
manner.  For the development banks themselves, ESS can create better project effectiveness by miti-
Stakeholder Benefit 
Global Equitable use of resources 
Enhancement of global public goods 
Development banks Greater project effectiveness 
Mitigation of environmental and social risk 
Management of reputation risk 
Realization of broader development goals 
Borrower governments Better management of natural resources 
Strengthening of institutional capacities 
Mitigation of environmental and social risk 
Realization of broader development goals 
Local communities Enhanced voice and ownership 
Reduced vulnerability 
Improved livelihoods 
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gating the social and environmental risks of a project and helping to address the broader development 
goals of their charters.  Identifying ahead of time that a particular project could cause environmental 
degradation and/or create mass social conflict is important to maintaining project schedules and 
creating more certainty regarding future costs.  When such risk is not accounted for the costs can 
be unexpectedly high, resulting in project overruns and sometimes resulting in project cancellation. 
Moreover, problem projects can tarnish the image of a development bank and decrease its ability to 
provide future services in a country or region.  These same benefits hold for national governments 
that need to manage debt burdens and political constituencies in a manner that will maximize na-
tional benefit. ESS can help developing countries build institutions to address market failures such as 
environmental externalities and meet their own broader development goals and international obliga-
tions. Engaging local communities and civil society through ESS can also bring benefits by helping 
communities assume ownership of projects through letting their voices and concerns be heard and 
incorporated.  Designed properly, ESS can also reduce the vulnerability of communities from certain 
projects and thus improve their livelihoods of such communities.
Alongside these benefits there are also costs associated with ESS.  There is a broad perception that 
safeguards contribute to costly project delays and they can be seen as impositions on borrowing 
countries that rely on receiving project support.   A recent study based on over 100 interviews with 
staff from various MDBs finds that ESS make it: 
“… extremely difficult for borrowers and even staff to fully understand. Requirements often 
include time-consuming, lengthy studies to be undertaken by third-party experts (usu-
ally at the government’s cost), lengthy consultations with affected parties (sometimes in-
cluding unelected non-governmental organizations), extensive mitigation measures, and 
lengthy mandatory prior public disclosure and comment periods during which time the 
project cannot move ahead. These requirements supersede whatever national laws may 
be in place in the borrowing country—a particularly troubling point of principle for many 
borrowing countries, beyond the practical impacts of safeguards. (Humphrey 2015a, 15).”
The World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group partly confirm these perceptions in a com-
prehensive assessment of World Bank safeguard policies published in 2010. Out of a survey of more 
than 100 stakeholders, the World Bank found that in LAC, 60 percent of initially proposed large scale 
World Bank projects were avoided by clients because of ESG systems and “38 percent of task team 
leaders, 72 percent of social specialists, and 55 percent of environmental specialists had encountered 
clients who wanted to avoid all or part of a project because of safeguard policies. The impact of this 
chilling effect was reported by a majority of team leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean and 
over 40 percent from East Asia and Pacific and South Asia, which have the most active safeguards 
portfolios. (World Bank, 2010, 46)”
In another study, Humphrey (2015b) was told by IADB environmental staff that  “There was a point 
when some folks at the IADB were trying to court Brazil to finance that project, and the immediate 
response from the Brazilians was, ‘Not on our life, you’ll come running in here with your safeguards,’” 
the staffer said, in others borrowing countries.”  (Humphrey, 2015).  Another cost is project delay: 
Humphrey estimates the length of approval time for projects on a whole (including ESS) and esti-
mates that approval time in LAC for the World Bank is 14 months (Humphrey, 2015b).   As we will see 
below, there are also costs involved with deferring ESS to national country systems.  Although such 
deference is considered faster and less costly, relying on national country systems for ESS costs the 
World Bank $104,000 on average for a particular project to ensure that such systems are enforced 
(Larson and Ballesteros, 2014).     
There is also evidence showing that safeguards can be done in a manner that does not trigger delays 
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in the project cycle, can avoid cost overruns, and can avoid immensely costly tail risks.  A recent study 
by the private bank BNAmericas found that LAC infrastructure projects currently face $133 billion in 
cost overruns, but environment and social concerns were cited as the least likely cause of an over-
run.  In an interview with the study author we were told that this was due to the fact that ESS mitigate 
the potential of certain classes of overruns (BNAmericas, 2015).  Moreover, internal research by the 
IADB finds that the costs of ESS are just 1 percent of project costs and that the ESS do not have an 
independent impact on the length of the project cycle (IADB, 2015c).  In contrast with the 14 months 
that a World Bank project takes to come to fruition (and an estimated cost of 3 percent of project 
costs), the IADB project cycle is just 5.8 months (Humphrey 2015a).  
It may be that the most costly and delayed projects are those that occur when ESS are not imple-
mented well, resulting in mass protests and environmental destruction.  When ESS go well they may 
go unnoticed and be taken for granted.  In Brazil, the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam, financed by the 
BNDES, did not incorporate key ESS measures and has been met by massive local and global resis-
tance--costing the participating firms and banks $1.4 to $5 million per day of delay due to protests 
(Nielson and Lima, 2013).  In contrast, few have heard of the Revantazon hydropower project in Costa 
Rica—Central America’s largest hydropower project that will supply ten percent of Costa Rica’s elec-
tricity per year.  The safeguards process revealed that the project would rip through a jaguar migra-
tion corridor, contaminate and redirect fish that form the source of local livelihoods, and impact local 
communities.  As a result of the process, the Revantazon project includes payments to landowners to 
set aside land for jaguar migration, a fisheries preservation project, and housing and health clinics for 
local communities (CNN, 2014).
While full assessments of the costs and benefits of ESS are hard to quantify, the Independent Evalu-
ation Group (IEG) of the World Bank (an independent monitoring group) conducted an assessment 
of the costs and benefits of ESS in 2010 and concluded that benefits from the “environmental safe-
guards far outweigh the incremental costs. In the case of social safeguards the benefits do not exceed 
the costs, but a number of benefits cannot be quantified” (World Bank, 2010, 78).   According to the 
World Bank, the typical cost of safeguards programs ranges from $116,000 to $225,000 per large-
scale project, ranging from 3.3 to 7.6 percent of project preparation and supervision costs by the 
World Bank.  For borrowing countries the average cost of compliance was $6 million, or 3 percent of 
the total project cost for the borrowing country.  Weighting risks and benefits from a sample of bank 
projects, the World Bank found that most sensitive projects yielded “low cost – low benefits or high 
cost – high benefits for recipient countries.”  In the same IEG survey mentioned above, the World 
Bank also found that over half of the “task team leaders surveyed reported that the Bank’s safeguards 
increased acceptability of the project among beneficiaries, and the safeguard policies also increased 
acceptability among nearly 30 percent of cofinanciers” (World Bank, 2010, 47).
A comprehensive comparative analysis of ESS across development banks operating in LAC is neces-
sary to determine the extent to which there is a lack of balance between costs and benefits of ESS 
in the project cycle.  In the meantime perception will serve as reality as ESS are often perceived in a 
negative manner among borrowers in LAC (Humphrey 2015b).  
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6. Summary and Recommendations
Development banks in LAC are poised to help shift the region’s economies from a “business as usual” 
scenario to a sustainable one.  In this study we have conducted an initial examination of the extent to 
which development banks operating in the region are providing green finance in LAC and analyzed a 
spectrum of approaches to ESS practiced.  We find that green finance is upwards of $61 billion dollars 
since 2007, representing 20 percent of total development bank finance in LAC.  We also find that a 
significant number of new projects are in inherently environmentally sensitive project areas—and it 
is not clear whether such projects are adequately safeguarded to anticipate and mitigate associated 
social and environmental risk. 
While development banks in the region have made inroads with respect to green finance and ESS, 
significant effort will be needed to scale up green finance and to adequately safeguard both green and 
conventional development projects.  Given the high priority that has been given to increasing green 
finance, and infrastructure in particular, we recommend the following policy options to improve green 
financing in LAC:
•  Sharpen the definition, measurement, and monitoring of ‘green finance’ and sustainable in-
frastructure.  Development banks have made great strides in attempting to define and measure 
‘green finance.’  The recent effort by the MDBs and the IDFC deserves particular praise.  How-
ever, some classifications such as the hydro-electric dams in tropical climates, deserve more 
attention.  Moreover, links need to be defined, drawn and measured on the extent to which 
green finance categorizations translate into reduced emissions and other environmental im-
pacts.  Given the importance and focus on infrastructure, a new set of indicators for sustainable 
infrastructure finance should be developed that incorporates both environmental and social risk.
•  Increase the operational capacity of development banks.  Significant new resources will be 
needed to meet country needs and the broader sustainable development goals.  New capital 
increases are often hard to come by, although the recent financial crisis triggered major in-
creases in the MDBs, in the BNDES, and the China development banks.  Given the scale of the 
needs and the political momentum for such finance, the SDGs could be a common entry point 
for re-capitalization.  A related consideration is to create new ‘green banks.’  In many ways, the 
North American Development Bank featured in this study is one example of a green bank for the 
Western Hemisphere.
•  Develop and scale up ‘green bond’ programs.  The EIB and the World Bank are pioneers in the 
green bond market while AFD and KfW are among largest global issuers.  These four banks 
have issued upwards of $27 billion in green bonds and the World Bank has issues $3.5 billion in 
LAC.  Other banks operating in the region could experiment with this approach, possibly for the 
co-financing of projects.  However, equal attention will need to go into monitoring of projects 
covered by green bonds to ensure that such financial flows are indeed green.
•  Expand and replicate sustainable co-financing.  In this study we discussed innovative co-fi-
nancing funds such as the China Co-financing Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean and 
the co-financing of green finance at the project level between the KfW and CAF and the KfW 
and BNDES at different times.  Pooling resources in this manner not only allows for increas-
ing green finance, but also provides opportunities for joint learning, technological transfer, and 
other forms of cooperation.
• Review and reform environmental and social safeguards.  The IDFC and the MDBs have de-
veloped a set of common principles for tracking climate finance and the IDFC banks have set a 
common goal to increase green finance to $100 billion by the end of 2015.  This convergence 
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is not replicated with respect to ESS.  A comparative and comprehensive review of ESS across 
IDBs, perhaps under the auspices of the IDFC, is necessary in order to help IDBs meet their 
broader sustainable development goals, and properly identify and mitigate social and environ-
ment risk.  In parallel with the green finance approach, the IDFC and MDBs can strive to achieve 
a set of common principles and trackable monitoring systems for ESS across development 
banks.  Particular attention is needed to improve access to information policies and grievance 
mechanisms with all stakeholders at the host country level.
As an organizing principle for a safeguards review, development banks should aim to recognize and 
enhance the national regulations and institutional capacities.  It is paramount that the BNDES and 
the Chinese development banks re-evaluate their approach to safeguards, as their relatively less de-
veloped approach may accentuate the risks associated with large energy and infrastructure projects. 
That said, policies do not always determine performance.  The World Bank has very stringent safe-
guards but had long been criticized for its lack of incorporation of environmental considerations (Rich, 
1995, 2013).  Whereas China’s banks and firms have weaker safeguards on paper, a recent study 
found that in some cases actors financed by China’s development banks performed better than their 
Western counterparts in mitigating social and environmental risk (Ray, et al, 2015).  
In safeguards evaluations, co-financing can provide official means to engage on these issues.  The 
co-financing arrangements between KfW and Bndes and IADB and China’s banks could prove to be 
solid ground for mutual learning.  Whereas China has the capital and infrastructure/energy expertise, 
the Western banks have a long history of engaging with local communities and conducting environ-
mental analyses in the region that was often learned the hard way.  By learning lessons in these areas 
all IDBs can meet their goals in the least risky manner.
As part of the re-evaluation process there is a significant need for more research and better meth-
odologies.  In the tracking of green finance we need better metrics to assess the environmental and 
social footprint of certain investments, particularly hydro-electric power.  There is also a significant 
amount of research needed on the costs and benefits of the various approaches to EGS.  Where some 
approaches along the spectrum may be too onerous, others may be wholly inadequate.  The 2010 
study by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group found that the World Bank ‘does not collect 
data on environmental and social benefits and costs (World Bank, 2010, 69).  This is highly concern-
ing as such information is essential for proper decision-making that balanced risks and reward for 
development finance.  Finally, there is a need for on-the-ground case studies of various projects and 
the implementation of policies in order to draw better insights into these phenomena.
Development banks need to make policies today in order to foster sustainable development in the 
future.  In this regard, the next decade or more is crucial.  Policy decisions taken now will have long-
term impact on development, social, and environmental outcomes.   We cannot afford to miss the 
opportunity offered to put in place a more sustainable and inclusive set of financing mechanisms for 
sustainable development. 
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Annex:  China Development Bank (Summary of Environmental Policy 
Commitments)
Compiled by Friends of the Earth (US) based on CDB 2005 bond prospectus; CDB 2007, 2008 and 
2009 CSR reports; 2008 CDB presentation during Green Credit Policy delegation meeting in Wash-
ington, DC; 2012 CDB presentation during International Green Credit Forum in Beijing, China.
Pre-lending stage:
Clients must be in compliance with all environmental laws of the People’s Republic of China;
All loan applications require an environmental impact assessment (EIA);
For highly polluting and energy-intensive industries such as coal mining, oil and gas exploration and 
development, power generation and transmission, hydropower, etc., EIAs must be approved by rel-
evant environmental authorities;
EIAs must be completed by an independent evaluator;
Environmental standards and costs can be written into loan covenants in order to commit borrowers 
to environmental promises;
The Bank can exercise the “one-ballot veto” procedure that allows loans to be rejected by the credit 
committee solely for environmental reasons;
The Bank assigns two personnel to do due diligence for each loan application: one to evaluate the loan 
and the other to evaluate the client;
The Bank also has an appraisal department to assess environmental and social risks, and also man-
ages environmental and social issues across business units.
Post-lending stage:
In order for loan requirements to be considered fulfilled, clients must provide proof from a relevant 
environmental department that the project meets environmental protection requirements.
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